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1. Introduction 
With its focus on sub-national or regional constitutional autonomy in Ethiopia, this paper 
entertains a topic that has hardly received any attention in the scholarship on Ethiopian 
constitutional law. Although all nine regions of the Ethiopian federation have adopted their 
own constitution, the prevailing argument is that these constitutions are merely copies of the 
federal constitution and can therefore rightly be ignored. Yet, although this argument might 
have held some truth for the regional constitutions that were adopted in the immediate 
aftermath of the coming into force of the federal constitution in 1995, this is no longer valid 
today. As from 2001 onwards, all regional constitutions were revised and since one of the 
major rationales behind this constitutional revision process was to design regional 
constitutions that were better adapted to regional realities, the regional constitutions now 
exhibit significant differences. This paper intends to compare all nine regional constitutions, 
identify the areas where significant divergences can be observed and explain the regional 
characteristics inducing these differences. The paper starts with a brief overview of the federal 
constitution, since the latter offers the basis for the regional constitutions. The regional 
constitutions largely follow the structure of the federal constitution and the federal 
constitution also determines the space for the regions to draft, adopt and amend their 
constitutions. Previewing the conclusion, it can already be pointed out that the constitutional 
space reserved for the regions is significant: the regions can include their own human rights 
catalogue (which should not deviate from, but can build on the protection offered by the 
federal constitution), they can design the structure of the regional political institutions, decide 
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on the organization, institutions, powers and responsibilities of local government, 
constitutionalize regional policy objectives and determine the procedure for constitutional 
amendment/revision. By providing an overview of how Ethiopia’s regions have used this 
constitutional autonomy, the paper will contribute to the existing knowledge on comparative 
sub-national constitutional law. 
 
2. The Federal Constitution: Constitutional Basis for Regional Constitutions 
The current constitution of Ethiopia was approved by a constituent assembly on 8 December 
1994 and came into force in August 1995. The constitution provided the country with a 
federal structure, as is unambiguously stated in its Article 1: “This Constitution establishes a 
Federal and Democratic State structure. Accordingly, the Ethiopian state shall be known as 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia” (my emphasis). A core feature of the 
constitution is the acknowledgement and institutional accommodation of ethnic diversity. 
With its 80+ officially recognized ethnic groups (“nations, nationalities and peoples” in the 
constitutional vernacular) Ethiopian society is indeed characterized by a considerable level of 
ethnic diversity. The constitutional acknowledgement of ethnic diversity is apparent from the 
outset since the preamble of the constitution starts with the proviso “We, the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”. The constitution grants these nations, nationalities and 
peoples or ethnic groups extensive rights subsumed under the concept of “self-determination”. 
Self-determination under the Ethiopian constitution includes language rights and cultural 
rights, political representation rights as well as territorial autonomy (up to and including the 
right to secession).
1
 The constitution emanates the idea that fulfilling the right to territorial 
autonomy is the best way to fulfil the other components of the right to self-determination as 
well. In other words, the establishment of “their” territory will enable Ethiopia’s ethnic groups 
to exercise their language rights, cultural rights and political representation rights. This idea 
constitutes the background to the constitutional establishment of nine regional states: the State 
of Tigray, the State of Afar, the State of Amhara, the State of Oromia, the State of Somali, the 
state of Benishangul-Gumuz, the State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the 
State of the Gambella peoples, and the State of the Harari people.
2
 The names of the first five 
states/regions refer to the ethnic group, which is dominant (numerically and politically) in that 
region i.e. the Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromo and Somali people. These five groups have been 
empowered by the establishment of “their” region within which they can exercise the different 
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components of the right to self-determination. The remaining four regions do not have a 
single dominant group. The name Benishangul-Gumuz refers to the Benishangul (also called 
Berta or Jebelawi) and Gumuz ethnic groups, yet both groups together constitute less than half 
of the regional population. The State of the Gambella peoples is similarly characterized by the 
absence of an ethnic majority group. The largest groups in the region are the Nuer (46.65 per 
cent of the regional population) and Anywaa (21.17 per cent of the regional population). 
Although the nomenclature of the State of the Harari people indicates that this region has been 
established for the Harari people, the latter merely constitute nine per cent of the regional 
population. The State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (hereafter Southern 
region), finally, is ethnically extremely diverse with 56 officially recognized nations, 
nationalities and peoples.
3
 The above overview of the ethnic composition of the regions 
demonstrates that four of the nine regions are characterized by a significant degree of ethnic 
pluralism.
4
 Ethnicity has therefore not been the sole criterion to determine the establishment 
of the regions. This is confirmed by Article 46(2) of the constitution, which stipulates that: 
“(regional) States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity 
and consent of the people concerned.” However, this should not raise doubts as to the multi-
national or ethnic nature of Ethiopia’s federation. Six ethnic groups have been empowered by 
the establishment of “their” region. Yet, the constitution unequivocally states that all ethnic 
groups (i.e. the 80+ officially recognized ones) have the unconditional right to set up their 
own regional state.
5
  
As is customary in federations, the distribution of state competencies between the federal 
government and the regions is enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution, mainly in Articles 51 
and 52. According to Article 52(2b), the regional states have the power to enact a state 
constitution. This power is also provided by Article 50(5), which stipulates that the State 
Council (i.e. the regional parliament) has the power to draft, adopt and amend the regional 
state constitution. Yet, the supremacy of the federal constitution, as proclaimed in its Article 
9(1), implies that the regional constitutions have to comply with the provisions of the federal 
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constitution. The discretion of the regional states to design regional constitutional provisions 
(i.e. their “constitutional space”6) is thus determined by the federal constitution.  
3. General Features and Aspirations of the Regional Constitutions 
Based upon the aforementioned provisions of the federal constitution, all regions quickly 
adopted their constitutions. The Oromia, Tigray, Southern, Somali, Harar and Amhara 
regional constitutions were adopted in 1995; the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regional 
constitutions were adopted in 1996 and the Afar region adopted its constitution in 1998. 
As from 2001 onwards, all regional constitutions were significantly revised and it is these 
revised versions that are analyzed and compared in this paper. The four core regions of the 
federation adopted their revised constitution around the same time at the end of 2001: the 
Oromia region adopted its revised constitution on 27 October 2001, the Amhara region on 5 
November 2001, the Southern region on 12 November 2001 and the Tigray region on 15 
November 2001. This was followed by the Afar region, which adopted its revised constitution 
on 5 July 2002 and the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions, which adopted their 
revised constitutions on 2 and 17 December 2002 respectively. The Somali region also 
adopted its revised constitution in 2002. The Harar region was the last to revise its regional 
constitution in 2004.  
Although all regional constitutions have a similar structure, they vary quite significantly in 
length. The Oromia regional constitution has a total of 113 articles, organized in 12 chapters. 
The Afar regional constitution includes 111 articles, organized in 11 chapters. Since the Afar 
constitution does not provide for the local government level of the Zone – as will be discussed 
in section 7 – the corresponding chapter of the Oromia constitution pertaining to the Zone is 
not included in the Afar constitution. The Somali regional constitution has 110 articles, 
equally organized in 11 chapters. The same is true for the Tigray regional constitution. The 
Amhara regional constitution contains 120 articles, organized in 12 chapters. The additional 
chapter incorporated in the Amhara constitution pertains to the organization, powers and 
duties of the Nationality Administrations, i.e. ethnic-based local governments in the region 
that cannot be found in the Afar, Somali, Oromia and Tigray regional constitutions. With its 
80 articles, organized in nine chapters, the Harar regional constitution is the shortest of all 
regional constitutions. The difference in chapters and length can be explained by the fact that 
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the Harar constitution, different from all other regional constitutions, does not provide for the 
local government level of the district/Wereda (see section 7) and by the absence of a separate 
chapter on policy objectives. The Benishangul-Gumuz regional constitution has 121 articles 
organized in 12 chapters. The Gambella regional constitution contains 125 articles and 13 
chapters, including one specific chapter on the structure of the regional state. The Southern 
constitution, finally, is the longest of all regional constitutions with 128 articles spread over 
12 chapters. All revised regional constitutions were adopted by the respective State Councils 
and the drafting was carried out either by standing committees of the Council or by 
committees appointed by the regional Chief Executive (the regional president).
7
 Since all 
State Councils at the time of adoption of the revised constitutions were controlled by the same 
political party, it is fair to argue that the rationale behind the constitutional revision reflected 
the objectives of the ruling party. This argument is supported by the preambles of the 
constitutions, which point out similar grounds for the constitutional revision.
8
  
All regional constitutions start with a preamble, which expresses that the regional constitution 
is the emanation of the will of the ethnic group(s) empowered by the establishment of the 
region. The preambles furthermore reflect upon the historical background to the adoption of 
the regional constitution and express the constitutional aspirations. 
The preambles take the reader back to the previous – pre-1991 – political regimes9 and point 
to the multifarious problems characterizing these regimes. The particular issues mentioned in 
this regard are human rights violations, ineffective economic and social policies, and social 
marginalization. Some of the regional constitutions (e.g. the Oromia and Somali constitutions) 
state that the members of the constitutionally empowered ethnic group were relegated to 
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second class citizen status. This includes a reference to the past assimilationist policies, which 
the introduction of multinational federalism has strongly discarded. 
After referring to this historical background, the regional constitutions point out that the 
federal constitution’s main objective was the setting up of a federal system, respecting both 
individual and group (nations, nationalities and peoples’) rights. Ensuring the rule of law and 
respecting human rights are also values underlying the regional constitutions. The 
constitutions acknowledging the ethnic diversity of the regional polity, such as the Gambella, 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Southern regional constitutions
10
 furthermore consider the objective 
of unity in diversity by emphasizing that the different nations, nationalities and peoples 
residing in the region have built up common interests and outlooks. 
As pointed out above, all regional constitutions mention the same objectives inducing the 
revision of the original constitutions. One is the achievement of good governance by 
strengthening accountability, transparency, efficiency, the separation of powers, and checks 
and balances. Another objective is adapting the regional constitutions to the objective reality 
of the regional states they are serving as basic law. 
The values and objectives articulated in the preambles are reflected in a number of 
fundamental constitutional provisions, which will be discussed in the next section. 
4. General Provisions and Fundamental Principles  
Next to the preamble, all regional constitutions start with a chapter on “general provisions”. 
With this, the regional constitutions follow the structure of the federal constitution, which 
includes a Chapter 1 with a similar title. Chapter 1 of the federal constitution includes seven 
articles dealing respectively with the nomenclature of the state, Ethiopian territorial 
jurisdiction, the Ethiopian flag, the National Anthem, language policy, Ethiopian nationality 
and gender. 
In the regional constitutions, the provisions of Chapter 1 are obviously focused on the 
regional state and pertain to the nomenclature of the region, the regional state boundaries, the 
state flag and emblem, the state anthem, regional language policy, the capital city of the 
region and gender.  
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With regards to the provisions on state boundaries, I argue that such provisions should only be 
included in the regional constitutions as far as these provisions reflect an agreement between 
the concerned regional states or are the result of a federal decision. It is not the mandate of a 
regional state to unilaterally determine its boundaries, lest it will lead to inter-regional 
boundary tensions and conflicts. Indeed, Article 48 of the federal constitution stipulates that 
all regional border disputes shall be settled by agreement of the concerned states or, when the 
states fail to reach agreement, by the House of the Federation (the federal 2
nd
 chamber).  
Flags and emblems allow the ethnic groups empowered by the establishment of a regional 
state to express their identity. Most regional constitutions state that the details pertaining to 
the flag and emblem will be determined by (ordinary) law, but Article 3 of the Oromia 
constitution limits the discretion of the ordinary law-maker in this regard. It determines that 
the sign of “Oda” will figure in the middle of the Oromia regional flag. The “Oda” symbol 
refers to the tree that plays a central role in the Gada system – the traditional Oromo 
governance system – as the place where the Gada leaders gather. The symbol is therefore a 
significant expression of Oromo identity. 
Using the power bestowed upon them by Article 5(3) of the federal constitution,
11
 all regions 
have enshrined in their constitutions provisions on language, specifying which language will 
be used as regional working language. In this regard, five of the nine regional constitutions 
have designated the language of the regionally empowered ethnic group as their regional 
working language i.e. Somali in the Somali region,
12
 Afarigna in the Afar region,
13 Afaan 
Oromo in the Oromia region,
14
 Tigrigna in the Tigray region
15
 and Amharic in the Amhara 
region.
16
 Harar is the only regional state that has designated two languages as working 
language i.e. Harari and Afaan Oromo. The three remaining regions are – as mentioned in 
section 2 – characterized by the absence of a single empowered ethnic group. They have 
therefore decided to avoid contentious debates on which languages to be selected as regional 
working languages and have pragmatically opted for the continued use of Amharic.
17
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Chapter 2 of the federal constitution proclaims the fundamental principles of the constitution. 
These are the principles that all sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia (Article 8),
18
 the supremacy of the federal constitution (Article 9), the 
commitment to human rights (Article 10), the separation of state and religion (Article 11), and 
the principle of good governance (Article 12). 
All regional constitutions also contain five fundamental principles. The first principle 
specifies the holder of the sovereign power at regional level. As mentioned above, the preamble 
of the regional constitutions already expressed that the regional constitutions are not 
necessarily assumed to be the emanation of the will of the nations, nationalities and peoples 
residing in the regions. They are rather the emanation of the will of the nations, nationalities 
and peoples empowered by the establishment of the region, who therefore hold sovereign 
power in the region. The regional constitutions furthermore proclaim the supremacy of the 
regional constitution, which means that the regional constitution is the supreme law of the 
region. The principle of constitutionalism is also included in all regional constitutions. Yet, 
this does not affect the supremacy of the federal constitution – as is acknowledged by all 
regional constitutions.
19 As a third fundamental principle, all regional constitutions proclaim 
their commitment to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
20
 The next section 
will show that this commitment is expressed by all regional constitutions through the 
inclusion of a comprehensive list of human rights. The principle of separation of state and 
religion is also included in all regional constitutions.
21
 None of the regional states is thus 
allowed to adopt a state religion. This is a notable principle, especially in the regional states 
where the population almost unanimously embraces one religion (i.e. Islam in Afar and 
Somali regions and Orthodox Christianity in the Tigray region). The fifth and last principle 
included in all regional constitutions is the commitment to good governance. 
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5. Human Rights  
The preamble of the federal constitution expresses a strong commitment to human rights. 
Whereas the human rights provisions of the federal constitution are most conspicuous for their 
inclusion of group rights – most notably the right to self-determination – the preamble equally 
emphasizes the importance of individual rights. The attention given to human rights by the 
Ethiopian federal constitution is furthermore reflected by Article 10, which proclaims the 
respect of human rights as one of the fundamental principles of the constitution. The logical 
consequence of this is that Chapter 3 of the constitution, spread over 31 Articles, contains an 
extensive list of human rights, including – according to the traditional taxonomy – first, 
second and third-generation human rights. The constitution leaves no doubt that this federal 
bill of rights is binding for both federal and regional state government organs where it 
stipulates in its Article 13(1) that “All Federal and State legislative, executive and judicial 
organs at all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to respect and enforce the 
provisions of this Chapter” (i.e. Chapter 3 on fundamental rights and freedoms). The binding 
nature of the federal bill of rights vis-à-vis the regional states could have justified a regional 
constitutional silence on human rights. Since the human rights protected by the federal 
constitution have to be adhered to by the regional government organs, there is no need to 
include a separate human rights catalogue in the regional constitutions. The regional 
constitutions could have sufficed with a reference to the federal bill of rights. Yet, doing so 
would have prevented the materialization of one of the advantages of regional constitutions: 
the possibility for a better human rights protection at regional level. Obviously, the supremacy 
of the federal constitution implies that the regional constitutions cannot violate human rights 
protected in the federal constitution by offering a lower degree of protection. The human 
rights included in the federal constitution offer a minimum guarantee that has to be upheld by 
the regional constitutions. However, the supremacy of the federal constitution and its human 
rights provisions would not be affected by regional constitutions offering a better protection 
of human rights.
22
 In this regard, with reference to the United States, it is observed that the 
federal bill of rights is a floor rather than a ceiling: “It establishes a standard, below which 
constituent units cannot go, but it does not otherwise limit state initiatives in expanding 
rights; they can build on that floor.”23 They can either do that by enshrining human rights that 
are not included in the federal constitution, by restricting the possibilities for human rights 
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limitations and derogations or by giving a more protective interpretation to human rights 
provisions. 
This section will therefore assess whether the regional constitutions not only adhere to, but 
also expand on the human rights provisions included in the federal constitution. In all regional 
constitutions, the bill of rights is, in the same way as in the federal constitution, included in 
Chapter 3. A cursory overview of the regional bills of rights shows that there are large 
similarities with the bill of rights included in the federal constitution. This means that all three 
generations of human rights (i.e. civil and political rights; social, economic and cultural rights 
as well as the so-called solidarity rights) are protected by the regional constitutions. The 
human rights catalogue included in the federal and regional constitutions starts with 
traditional civil and political rights, which listing – and its wording – is strongly inspired by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). One area where the 
regional constitutions offer a better protection than the federal constitution pertains to 
freedom of movement (Article 32 federal constitution). Freedom of movement as it is 
included in the federal constitution is identical to its counterpart protected by Article 12 of the 
ICCPR: “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a state shall, within that territory, have the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” The regional constitutions, 
on their part, give a wider meaning to freedom of movement by complementing the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose the residence with the right to work and to 
acquire property in the respective region.
24
 From the vantage point of ethnic minority 
protection, this is an important addition. It implies that regional government institutions 
cannot prevent citizens migrating from other regions from working or acquiring property in 
their region. Although the equality principle would also prohibit such discrimination, the 
substance given to freedom of movement by the regional constitutions expresses the 
commitment of the regional constitutional drafters to this principle. Apart from the Afar and 
Somali constitutions, all regional constitutions list, immediately after the provision on 
freedom of movement, the right of every Ethiopian resident to be elected to or employed by 
any public office in the region.
25
 This is once more a reflection of the regional constitutional 
drafters’ commitment to an equal treatment of all Ethiopian citizens residing in their regions. 
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The only requirement formulated by the regional constitutions is the ability to speak the 
working language of the region. The Tigray constitution is even a bit more lenient in this 
regard, since it stipulates that the ability to speak the regional working language, Tigrigna, is 
not mandatory in cases where the nature of the work does not require it.
26
 
Confirming the Ethiopian state’s commitment expressed by its ratification of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR), the federal constitution has 
enshrined this category of rights in its Article 41. A provision on economic, social and 
cultural rights can be found in all regional constitutions as well.
27
 Seven out of the nine 
regional constitutions contain provisions on social, economic and cultural rights that are 
almost identical to those found in Article 41 of the federal constitution. The constitutions of 
the Afar and Somali regions have made use of their constitutional space and constitutionalized 
– under the heading of social, economic and cultural rights – additional regional state 
obligations, which reflect and express specific regional socio-economic features and policy 
preferences. Article 41(4) of the Somali constitution reflects the predominant socio-economic 
activity of the regional population – pastoralism – when it repeats the federal constitutional 
obligation for the state to allocate ever increasing resources to providing the people with 
public health and education, but by adding that particular attention should be given to the 
pastoralists. A similar attention to pastoralists is included in the Afar constitution.
28
 
Most human rights are not granted absolutely and can be limited by the government if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are set out in so-called limitation or claw-back 
clauses. The Ethiopian constitutions do not include a general limitation clause applicable to all 
protected rights, but provide limitation clauses in relation to some human rights only.
29 It is 
noted that the limitation clauses of the federal constitution are verbatim transplanted into all 
regional constitutions. Hence, the regional constitutions have not used the opportunity to limit 
the limitations – and thus offer a stronger human rights protection – by curtailing the 
legitimate grounds for human rights limitations. 
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International law does not only sanction human rights limitations under expressly stated 
conditions, it also allows governments to suspend human rights in times of emergency. 
Whereas limitations are applied permanently, suspensions or derogations are imposed for the 
duration of the emergency period only.
30
 The possibility for the Ethiopian government to 
suspend human rights protected in the constitution during a state of emergency is provided by 
Article 93 of the federal constitution. Yet, some human rights are considered to be so 
fundamental that their suspension is prohibited, even in an emergency context. To be specific, 
Article 93(4c) of the constitution states that in the exercise of its emergency powers the 
Council of Ministers cannot suspend or limit Articles 1 (pertaining to the nomenclature of the 
Ethiopian state), Article 18 (prohibition against inhuman treatment), 25 (right to equality) and 
sub-Articles 1 and 2 of Article 39 (the right to self-determination). The provisions on state of 
emergency included in the regional constitutions (authorizing a regional state of emergency) 
are modelled on the corresponding provisions of the federal constitution, yet several regional 
constitutions have significantly widened the number of human rights protected from 
derogation or suspension in the context of emergency. Here, we are confronted with an 
instance where the regional constitutions have built on the human rights foundations laid by 
the federal constitution.
31
  
A better, more extensive human rights protection can also be realized through a more 
expansive interpretation of the regional human rights provisions by the bodies empowered to 
interpret the regional constitution. The regional constitutions are interpreted by regional 
bodies set up specifically for this purpose (apart from the Council of Nationalities in the 
Southern region, which has additional competencies
32
). Yet, the odds that these regional 
bodies, called Constitutional Interpretation Commissions, are going to interpret the regional 
constitutional provisions on human rights in a more expansive way than the interpretation 
given to similar provisions in the federal constitution by the House of the Federation
33
 are not 
high – that is if all regions were to follow the example of the Oromia region. The Oromia 
regional law establishing the regional Constitutional Interpretation Commission stipulates in 
its Article 19(3) that fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution shall be 
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interpreted in a manner conforming to …decisions of the House of the Federation on 
similar matters 34 (my emphasis). 
The foregoing demonstrates that the regional constitutions in Ethiopia exhibit only a few 
instances where human rights provisions offer a more expansive protection than the human 
rights protection available in the federal constitution. Yet, the constitutional autonomy of the 
regions also implies the power to amend/revise the text of the regional constitution. This 
revision takes place according to a specific procedure set out in every regional constitution. 
Therefore, changing political, economic and social environments in the regions could induce 
the latter to include additional human rights provisions in their constitutions. Yet, the regions 
themselves have blocked this avenue towards a more wide-ranging human rights protection. 
All regional constitutions include the statement that the provisions of Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
regional constitution (Chapter 3 being the chapter on human rights) can only be amended if 
the provisions of Chapters 2 and 3 of the federal constitution are amended.
35
 
6. Regional Institutional Framework 
 
Article 50 of the federal constitution contains a number of statements that pertain to the 
institutional structure of the regions and that therefore constitute a mandatory frame for them 
i.e. that determine the constitutional space for the regions to design their institutional 
structure. Article 50(2) stipulates that the states shall have legislative, executive and judicial 
powers. The power of legislation on matters falling under (regional) State jurisdiction is 
allotted to the State Council.
 36
 The State Council is the highest organ of regional state 
authority, which is responsible to the people of the state.
37
 This provision appears to prescribe 
a parliamentary system of government at regional level. The highest organ of executive power 
at regional level is the State administration.
38
 Article 50(7) stipulates that regional state 
judicial powers are vested in the regional courts. This federal framework leaves considerable 
discretionary power for the regional states to decide on the structure, composition, powers and 
responsibilities of their institutions. Yet, regional constitutional space is significantly 
                                                          
34
 Oromia Proclamation No. 167/2011, “A Proclamation enacted to establish Oromia Constitutional 
Interpretation Commission and determine its Powers and Duties”, Megeleta Oromia 18 July 2011. 
35
 Article 112(1) Oromia constitution, Article 109(1) Somali constitution, Article 110(1) Afar constitution, 
Article 107(1) Tigray constitution, Article 118(1) Amhara constitution, Article 79(1) Harar constitution, Article 
119(1) Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, Article 123(1) Gambella constitution and Article 125(2) Southern 
constitution. 
36
 Article 50(5) federal constitution. 
37
 Article 50(3) federal constitution. 
38
 Article 50(6) federal constitution. 
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narrowed as far as the regional judiciary is concerned. In its Articles 78, 79, 80 and 81, the 
federal constitution contains provisions related to the structure of the regional judiciary and 
pertaining to the appointment, removal and jurisdiction of regional judges/courts. Since the 
federal constitution is supreme, the regions have to adhere to these provisions, seriously 
affecting their constitutional space.  
 
Within the federal frame, all regional constitutions have inserted provisions elaborating on 
their institutional structure. From the outset, it can be mentioned that seven out of the nine 
regional constitutions provide for a similar institutional structure. The Harar and Southern 
regional constitutions are the exceptions to this pattern and demonstrate specific features. 
All regional constitutions start with repeating the pertinent provisions of the federal 
constitution. The legislative body of the regional state is the regional State Council. The 
regional State Council is the highest authority of the regional state and is accountable to the 
people whom it represents.
39
 The regional constitutions confirm the impression that the 
federal constitution prescribes a parliamentary system of government at regional level by 
stating that the regional Administrative Council, the highest regional executive, shall be 
responsible to the State Council, i.e. the regional parliament.
40
 
 
In eight of the nine regions, the members of the State Council are directly elected for a term of 
five years on the basis of universal suffrage and by free, fair and secret ballot.
41
 The only 
exception to this pattern is the State Council in the Harar region where part of the Council’s 
membership is elected on the basis of suffrage limited to the Harari people. The Harari State 
Council is composed of two chambers: The People’s Representative Assembly (PRA) and the 
Harari National Assembly (HNA). The 22 seats of the PRA and the 14 seats reserved for the 
HNA together constitute the 36 seats of the regional State Council.
42
 The membership of the 
HNA is limited to people with Harari identity.  
 
                                                          
39
 Article 46(1) Oromia constitution, Article 46(1) Somali constitution, Article 44(1) Afar constitution, Article 
46(1) Tigray constitution, Article 46(1) Amhara constitution, Article 46(1) Harar constitution, Article 46(1) 
Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, Article 49(1) Gambella constitution and Article 46(1) Southern constitution. 
40
 Article 46(2) Oromia constitution, Article 46(2) Somali constitution, Article 44(2) Afar constitution, Article 
46(2) Tigray constitution, Article 46(2) Amhara constitution, Article 46(2) Harar constitution, Article 46(2) 
Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, Article 49(2) Gambella constitution and Article 46(2) Southern constitution. 
41
 Article 48(1) Oromia constitution, Article 48(1) Somali constitution, Article 46(1) Afar constitution, Article 
48(1) Tigray constitution, Article 48(1) Amhara constitution, Article 48(1) Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, 
Article 51(1) Gambella constitution and Article 50(1) Southern constitution. 
42
 Article 48 and 49 Harar constitution. 
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The major powers of the State Council are law-making and exercising parliamentary 
oversight. The State Council has the power of legislation on all matters falling under regional 
state jurisdiction. The parliamentary system of government, hinted at in other provisions, is 
clearly expressed by the election of the Chief Executive by and from among the members of 
the State Council. The Chief Executive selects potential members of the regional Executive 
Council and submits his/her list with nominees for approval to the State Council.
43
 The 
selection and appointment of members of the regional Executive Council therefore shows 
clear parallels with the process followed for the selection and appointment of the Prime 
Minister and other ministers at federal level.
44
 Such parallelism between the federal and 
regional constitutions is common in federations. In other words, when the federal constitution 
provides for a parliamentary or presidential system of government, such system is commonly 
replicated in the regional constitutions.
45
 The only exception to this pattern in Ethiopia is the 
selection of the regional Chief Executive in the Harar region. The regional constitutional 
ambition of guaranteeing the interests of the Harari people in “their” region, has led to the 
constitutional arrangement that the candidate for the position of regional Chief Executive has 
to be selected by the Harari National Assembly, i.e. the assembly exclusively elected by and 
composed of Harari members.
46
 It is subsequently the State Council that will approve or reject 
this nomination. The difference between the federal level and the regional level is that the 
positions of Head of State and Head of Government at federal level are separated between the 
President and Prime Minister whereas at regional level the Chief Executive is both head of 
state and head of government. Since the legitimacy of the regional Chief Executive and other 
members of the regional Executive Council is based on their selection and/or approval by the 
State Council, they are also accountable to it – as is common in parliamentary systems. The 
regional constitutions therefore contain a number of tools through which the State Council can 
exercise oversight over the executive. For instance, all regional constitutions provide that the 
State Council has the power to call and question the regional Chief Executive and other 
regional officials and that it has the duty to investigate the performance of the regional 
                                                          
43
 Article 49(3e) Oromia constitution, Article 49(3e) Somali constitution, Article 47(3e) Afar constitution, 
Article 49(3e) Tigray constitution, Article 49(3.5) Amhara constitution, Article 51(2h) Harar constitution, 
Article 49(3.5) Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, Article 52(3.6) Gambella constitution and Article 51(3d) 
Southern constitution. 
44
 The federal Prime Minister is elected by and from among the members of the federal House of People’s 
Representatives. The Prime Minister will subsequently draw up a list with nominees for ministerial positions and 
submit this list for approval to the House of People’s Representatives. 
45
 John Dinan, “Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries”, Rutgers Law Journal Vol. 39 
2008, (837) 853-856. 
46
 Article 63(1) Harar constitution. 
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Executive Council.
47
 Another tool enabling the State Council to exercise parliamentary 
oversight is the power to approve the regional state budget.
48
  
As mentioned above, the Harar and Southern regional constitutions demonstrate specific 
features with regards to the regional institutional structure. These specific features are mainly 
related to the organization of the State Council. It was already mentioned that the Harar State 
Council is composed of two chambers: The People’s Representative Assembly (PRA) and the 
Harari National Assembly (HNA). The revised Southern constitution of 2001 provides for a 
second council at regional level: the Council of Nationalities. The Council of Nationalities is 
the representative body of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of the region.
49
 Each Nation, 
Nationality and People shall be represented by at least one member and by one additional 
representative for each one million of its population.
50
 The current membership of the Council 
of Nationalities is composed of 61 members, representing 56 different ethnic groups.
51
  
The Afar constitution – again reflecting the Afar region’s specific features – furthermore 
allows for the establishment of Councils of Elders at the various administrative levels.
52
 The 
establishment of elders’ and clan leaders’ Councils is also provided for by the Somali 
constitution.
53
 
Due to the precedence of the federal constitution, all regional constitutions have adopted the 
provisions of the federal constitution concerning the structure of the regional judiciary and 
pertaining to the appointment, removal and jurisdiction of regional judges/courts. As 
mentioned in section 5, all regional constitutions (except for the Southern constitution) have 
allocated the power of constitutional interpretation to a Constitutional Interpretation 
Commission. 
 
                                                          
47
 Article 49(3q) Oromia constitution, Article 49(3p) Somali constitution, Article 47(3q) Afar constitution, 
Article 49(3q) Tigray constitution, Article 49(3.17) Amhara constitution, Article 51(2q) Harar constitution, 
Article 49(3.17) Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, Article 52(3.17) Gambella constitution and Article 51(3o) 
Southern constitution. 
48
 Article 49(3j) Oromia constitution, Article 49(3i) Somali constitution, Article 47(3l) Afar constitution, Article 
49(3j) Tigray constitution, Article 49(3.11) Amhara constitution, Article 51(2m) Harar constitution, Article 
49(3.11) Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, Article 52(3.11) Gambella constitution and Article 51(3i) Southern 
constitution. 
49
 Article 58(1) Southern constitution. 
50
 Article 58(2) Southern constitution. 
51
 See the website of the Southern regional government: http://www.snnprs.gov.et/nations.html (last accessed 7 
February 2014). 
52
 Article 63 Afar constitution. 
53
 Article 56 Somali constitution. 
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7. Local Government 
Ethiopia’s regions have significant discretionary power to determine the organization, 
institutional structure, powers and responsibilities of sub-regional or local government. 
Article 50(4) of the federal constitution stipulates that “State (i.e. sub-regional) government 
shall be established at State and other administrative levels that they (i.e. the regions) find 
necessary.” The only constitutional mandate is that “Adequate power shall be granted to the 
lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of 
such units.” This constitutional mandate prohibits a centralized local government structure. 
The regions have made considerable use of their discretion in this regard and all regional 
constitutions contain provisions related to local government. Before we take a look at these 
provisions, it has to be pointed out that not all levels of local government are included in the 
regional constitutions. Urban local governments (cities) for instance, are not entrenched in the 
constitutions, but operate on the basis of ordinary regional laws/proclamations. The same is 
true for the local government administration of the Zone in the Afar, Somali and Tigray 
regions. The Oromia and Southern regional constitutions do entrench the Zone, but the Zones 
in both regions vary significantly as far as structure, objectives, powers and responsibilities 
are concerned. The Zone in the Oromia region is merely an executive organ.
54
 The Zonal 
administrators are appointed by the regional Executive Council upon the recommendation of 
the regional Chief Executive/President.
55
 The Zones are deconcentrated bodies of the regional 
government, carrying out regional activities at local level. The Zones in the Southern region 
on the other hand do have their own Council composed of locally elected members. The 
Southern Zones are not merely designed for administrative purposes, but constitute fora where 
the ethnic groups of the region can exercise the different aspects of their right to self-
determination; they are ethnic-based local governments. As mentioned in section 2, the 
Southern region is ethnically extremely diverse. It can be recalled that the Ethiopian 
constitution emanates the idea that fulfilling the right to territorial autonomy is the best way to 
fulfil the other components of the right to self-determination as well. Yet, political and 
expediency reasons have until now prevented the establishment of new ethnic-based regions. 
Regions that are ethnically diverse, such as the Southern region, have therefore attempted to 
fulfil the right to self-determination of their various ethnic groups through the establishment 
of ethnic-based sub-regional/local governments. This constitutes the background to the design 
                                                          
54
 Article 71(1) Oromia constitution. 
55
 Article 72(1) Oromia constitution. 
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of the Zones in the Southern regional constitution and explains why the Southern Zones have 
powers such as determining the Zonal/local working language and protecting the history of 
the ethnic group(s) empowered by the establishment of the Zone. The Zone furthermore 
enables the concerned ethnic group(s) to exercise a certain degree of self-rule through the 
power of the Zonal Council to approve the Zonal budget and through its power to select and 
appoint its Chief Administrator and other members of the Zone Administrative Council. 
Similar ethnic-based local governments, called Nationality Administrations/Nationality Zones 
are entrenched in the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regional constitutions.  
All regional constitutions – except the Harar constitution which only mentions the Kebele – 
additionally provide for the administrative level of the Wereda (district) and the Kebele.  The 
Kebele are subordinate to the Wereda, which in turn are subordinate to the Zones/Nationality 
Administrations. The provisions related to the institutional structure, powers and 
responsibilities of the Wereda and Kebele are near to uniform in all regional constitutions. 
The districts have a district council (assembly) and an executive body, the Administrative 
Council. The members of the district council are directly elected by the population from the 
different Kebele in the district. The district council has important competences such as the 
approval of the budget of the district and the approval of plans in the area of social services 
and economic development. Executive power is exercised by the Administrative Council, 
headed by the Chief Administrator. The Chief Administrator is elected by and from among 
the members of the district council and is accountable to this council and to the regional 
president (or – if the district is situated in a Nationality Administration or Zone – to the Chief 
Administrator of the latter). The district Chief Administrator selects the other members of the 
Administrative Council, whose appointment must be approved by the district council. The 
Kebele has a similar institutional structure. 
8. Policy Principles and Objectives 
In its Chapter 10, the federal constitution formulates policy principles and objectives that have 
to be adhered to by any government organ, both federal and regional, in the exercise of their 
powers and responsibilities.
56
 Due to the supremacy of the federal constitution, these 
objectives are binding for the regional state organs; yet, this does not prevent them from 
complementing these with other objectives, reflecting specific elements of the regional polity 
or expressing specific policy choices. Reflecting the specific features of the regional 
                                                          
56
 Article 85 federal constitution. 
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population, the Afar constitution mentions the promotion of the living standards of the 
pastoralists as one of the economic objectives of the regional government.
57
 A similar 
economic objective is included in the Somali constitution.
58
 Both constitutions also mention 
the fight against desertification as a regional environmental policy objective. 
9. Miscellaneous Provisions 
Under this heading, the regional constitutions detail the procedure that has to be followed in 
case of a regional state of emergency and they discuss the position and powers of the Auditor 
General. It is also here that we can find the constitutional amendment or revision procedure. 
Although there are some notable differences between the various regional constitutions with 
regards to the state of emergency procedure,
59
 the major variations can be observed with 
regards to the constitutional amendment procedure. All regional constitutions have designed 
different procedures although some procedures, such as the Tigray and Oromia or the Amhara 
and Gambella ones are very similar.
60
 
10. Assessing the Use of Regional Constitutional Space 
As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the constitutional space left for the regions by the 
federal constitution is significant. At the same time, it has been observed that this space has 
not been fully occupied by the regional constitutions. This is particularly true in the area of 
human rights, where the regional constitutions have largely copied the provisions of the 
federal constitution. Admittedly, it might not be fair to have elevated expectations in this 
regard considering that the existence of regional constitutions is a very recent and under-
studied experience in Ethiopia. Yet, the procedure for constitutional amendment/revision 
enshrined in all state constitutions, effectively making the inclusion of more protective human 
rights provisions dependent upon the amendment of the federal constitution, constitutes a 
                                                          
57
 Article 102(2) Afar constitution. 
58 Article 101(2) Somali constitution. 
59
 Whereas the Southern constitution stipulates that the decree of state of emergency has to be approved by a 
two-thirds majority vote in the State Council, the Benishangul-Gumuz constitution merely requires an ordinary 
majority. Furthermore, the Afar and Tigray constitutions provide that the renewal of the decree of state of 
emergency may not be allowed more than three times.  
60
 In the Tigray and Oromia regions, a revision/amendment of the regional constitution can be initiated by the 
State Council, by the State government, by the Wereda Councils or by the Kebele Councils. The actual revision 
requires the consent of a certain number of Wereda Councils and a three-quarter majority vote in the State 
Council. In the Amhara and Gambella regions, a revision of the regional constitution can additionally be initiated 
by the Nationality Councils. Furthermore, the revision also requires the consent of – a certain number of – the 
Nationality Councils. 
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wholly unnecessary self-restraint. Neither does the provision of the Oromia law binding the 
regional Constitutional Interpretation Commission in its interpretation of regional 
constitutional provisions on human rights to the interpretation given by the House of the 
Federation augur well for a more expansive regional protection of human rights. Some of the 
regions have on the other hand made considerable use of their discretion to design political 
institutions rooted in the regional context and serving particular regional objectives. The 
examples of the bi-cameral State Council in the Harar region and the Council of Nationalities 
in the Southern region illustrate this point. Other examples are the clan leaders and elders 
councils referred to in the Somali and Afar constitutions. The regional constitutions also 
demonstrate notable differences in the area of local government. This is mainly the case for 
the administrative level immediately below the regional government: the Zone. Although 
Zones are operating in all regions except Harar (due to the small territory of this region), they 
are not entrenched in the regional constitutions of Tigray, Afar and Somali. The remaining 
five regional constitutions do entrench the Zone, but the Zone in the Oromia region is a 
deconcentrated administration merely set up for administrative purposes, whereas the 
Zones/Nationality Administrations in the Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Amhara and 
Southern regions are decentralized ethnic-based local governments. These ethnic-based local 
governments are designed to enable the various ethnic groups in the region to exercise their 
right to self-determination. Although four regions have thus used their constitutional space to 
accommodate intra-regional ethnic pluralism by designing ethnic-based local governments, 
the uniformity of this approach has inherent weaknesses.  The ethnic-based local governments 
in all four regions emanate the idea – also reflected in the federal constitution – that ethnic 
groups can best exercise their group rights within their own territory. Yet, such idea 
disregards the fact that not all ethnic groups are living concentrated in one area. The territorial 
dispersal of ethnic groups is one of the reasons why at the time of writing no Nationality 
Administration had been established in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, more than 10 years 
after the coming into force of the regional constitution enshrining them. This reminds us of 
the well-accepted truth that although constitutional drafters can be inspired by arrangements 
included in other constitutions, they should not simply transplant them into a different 
context.  
Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown that regional constitutions are definitely more than simple 
copies of the federal constitution. Obviously, the federal constitution sets the frame, but this 
 21 
frame is wide enough for the regions to add their own arrangements. In some areas, such as 
human rights, the regions have underutilized their autonomy and the probability of a better 
regional human rights protection is rather bleak. Yet, the regions have made use of their 
discretion to design specific political institutions and local government administrations. In the 
design of local government administrations, the regional constitution-makers have largely 
copied from each other and this has, in some instances, led to arrangements ill-adapted to the 
regions they are expected to serve. Of course, our judgment should not be too harsh since 
Ethiopia’s regions have only existed for barely 20 years and have only recently started to 
exercise their constitutional autonomy. It is the hope of this author that as the Ethiopian 
federal system matures, the regions will increasingly make use of their constitutional 
autonomy to design constitutional arrangements that are well-equipped to achieve the 
objectives set out in the preambles of the federal and regional constitutions. 
